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In a recent study, the French  Commissariat général au plan (CGP, 1999) presents
evolving factors of European economic geography using recent theoretical investigations. Its
findings are more qualified than in previous works:
– In the single market, soaring intra-industry trade (bilateral trade of similar products)
is balanced with an increase in vertical differentiation. The diversification of national
economies, combined with the extension of intra-branch trade, can go along with a vertical
specialization reflecting economic discrepancies along the quality spectrum and through
differentiated technological developments. A hierarchy among European economies remains
following that vertical  specialization.
– However, those specialization schemes are questioned by both the EMU and
agglomeration forces linked to increasing scale economies, trade and technological
externalities and lesser transaction costs. New patterns in vertical specialization could emerge
from a geographical cluster of high knowledge activities.
Actually, interaction between specialization and concentration dynamics draws a new
European geography both diversified and hierarchical. The EMU may influence that process:
comparable prices and lower transaction costs mean a full trade integration. Thus, the EMU
more clearly reveals spatial heterogeneity in Europe. For that matter, the EU presents some
specificity compared to the United States: activities are less geographically concentrated than
in the United States, but regional growth inequalities measured by the income per capita are
stronger ( Puga, 1999). The relationship between geographical concentration and regional
growth is not simple. If the agglomeration process goes with workers mobility, it entails an
increase in wages which tends to level out incomes. By contrary, a geographical partitioning
may slowdown concentration but also perpetuate income disparities. Geographical
concentration does not create territorial inequalities in the social field by itself, but only if
productivity gains and wages increases do not spread over the considered space. Here is the
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problematic European specificity: the EMU can release agglomeration forces without
modifying labor mobility, except for very limited groups of workers.
Thus, determining factors in geographical partition of activities appear sufficiently
complex to give rise, by their combination, to very different trajectories. This irresolution –
homogenization versus a center/periphery pattern – depends also on the scale of the
considered territory. Whereas diversification tends to predominate at a national level,
specialization clearly characterizes the regional scale. The more are the regions able to fit into
geographical, technological and trade networks, the better is that specialization. To go into
this analysis more closely might be possible by searching for relevant territories, that is to say
economic and geographical entities with common and identifiable resources (social
capabilities and comparative advantages) that can be used to take part efficiently in the
European and world economic networks.
Refereeing to the theoretical opposition between convergence-diversification forces
and agglomeration-specialization ones, the  CGP report defines two opposite elementary
scenarios. A synthesis scenario derives from the nation/region duality, with predominant
specialization forces at the regional level and diversification forces at the nation-State level.
This emphasis on the nation/region duality is particularly relevant to the European integration
process, even more with the monetary union. Paradoxically, the existing nation-States may
have to cope with a new internal heterogeneity created under EMU. The CGP report finds that
paradox might have some implications in terms of thinking structural and redistribution
policies:
1-  In the case that regional differentiation reflects development dynamics at work,
corrective policies favoring diversification could be inefficient in terms of
European global growth, at the expense of dynamic metropolis.
2-  In the line with the subsidiarity principle, territorial income inequalities should be
tackled as infra-national issues. So why does it remain an essential community
problem ? The report suggests to distinguish between cohesion policies which are
the matter of  nation-States and structural policies (as technology policy) which
would aim at promoting an efficient spatial scheme for collective growth and
which would be defined at the European level.
There are good reasons for questioning that approach. One is that regional path in a
nation-State depends on the insertion of each region in the European geography. Geographical
imbalances are very imperfectly corrected by national institutions.5
This paper comes within the scope of that debate by measuring relative growth
performances of European regions over the period 1986-96. The correlation between these
performances and the national membership of regions is investigated as well as the link with
their access to the European structural funds. Examination of the features of the growth
process within the European regions is delimitated by the particular period 1986-96. On the
one hand, this is a complex transition period owing to the combination of the course towards
single market and monetary union with deflationary policies. On the other hand, over that ten-
years period, the structural funds were soaring in the hope of helping backward or threatened
regions. The pluri-annual programming of the community budget dates back to 1988. This
paper considers the EU structural funds transferred over the two first programming periods
(1989-93 and 1994-99). Although the considered period allows a detailed appraisal of the
efficiency of the structural funds, it would not be advisable to provide too comprehensive
results: the effects of macro-economic policies implemented for the period 1986-96 have
interfered with the efficiency of the European structural funds. Finally, if the starting point is
the couple of years 1986-87, at the eve of the first budget period, the analysis ends with the
year 1996, the last one with available regional macro-economic data, which does not
correspond to the end of the second programming period
1. Obviously, the structural funds
incurred for that second period are not yet completely spent in 1996. Nevertheless, the
observed features in the nature of regional development remain probably valuable after 1996,
even within an European economic recovery. Moreover, an early analysis can urge to modify
perfectible instruments…
Regional catching up paths conditioned by national membership
A first approach consists in investigating European and national catch-up paths of
backward regions over the period 1986-96. Figures 1 to 12 plot the base-year per capita GDP
(in 1986-87) of each country or region at purchasing power parity, relatively to the
community average, against the growth of that country or region between 1986-87 and 1996
compared with the average community growth. These figures refer to the  b-convergence
concept as defined by the economic literature 
2. Per capita GDPs (denoted by y) of N countries
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or regions (indexed by  i) comply with this b-convergence if their variation between a base
year 0 and the terminal year T follows, with a positive coefficient b, the relationship:
Log(yit) - Log(yi0) = a - b Log(yi0)      i = 1…N                                                                     (1.1)
Considering GDP relatively to average per capita GDP  y  of the considered set
( t it
r
it y y y / = ), the  b-convergence relationship is even simpler, if all elements in the
geographical set are said to obey that same relationship:
Log(
r
it y ) - Log(
r
i y 0) = – b Log(
r
i y 0)      i=1…N                                                        (1.2)
If this absolute b-convergence prevails, the more the countries or regions are initially
depressed, the faster is their growth process. The  b-coefficient reflects the catching up
intensity. A coefficient equal to 1 indicates a full catching up over the considered time period.
b/T gives the annual catching up rate.
Figures 1 to 12 show the relevance of the relationship (1.2): the horizontal axis
measures the log of the relative base-year GDP per capita and the vertical axis measures the
log of the relative growth
3. This relationship would be confirmed by a linear negative
correlation between the considered variables. The catch-up intensity  b is provided by the
slope in absolute value. The effectiveness of a b-convergence process appears through the
shape of those figures.
Graph 1 shows this relationship within twelve EC countries over the ten-years period.
It suggests that a process of  b-convergence may exist between European nations.
Nevertheless, its relevance depends largely on relative performances achieved by three small-
size countries, Greece, Portugal and Ireland, and on a relative German slowdown as well. The
same statement is possible when replacing the national data set by data for the corresponding
131 regions
4 (graph 2), although the slope seems to be damped down with the initially richer
regions: they do not have much declined in relative terms. However, this statement is no more
valuable by eliminating from the data set the Irish, Greek, Portuguese regions as well as the
French overseas departments (Guadeloupe,  Réunion, Martinique,  Guyane), the Spanish
enclave in Morocco, Ceuta y Melilla, all regions initially very depressed, and finally the rich
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Groningen region in the Netherlands, which endured a dramatic slump. The observed set of
points is much more confuse and does not reveal a clear b-convergence (graph 3). On the
whole, this set is centered on the axis origin – moderately rich regions have a moderate
growth –. But, no further correlation between the base-year prosperity and the relative growth
performance can be drawn. This points how much catching up performances are conditioned
by regional ones achieved by three particular small countries and by those of specific
peripheral regions, such as French overseas regions.
Graph 1
This vulnerability of the apparent regional catching up to the sample incites to a
country by country approach, relatively to the community average (graphs 4 to 12). The
nature of the national relation and the location of national regions have to be taken into
account for an accurate comprehension of these close-ups. Then it is obvious that regional
convergence depends closely on the national membership. Catching up paths differ according
to the country considered. Short national comments emphasize these discrepancies:
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– Greece (graph 4) and Portugal (graph 5) present an effective though unachieved
regional catching up. In Greece, relative growth is relatively higher for the most depressed
regions. But this seems to fade too fast: it does not nearly exist for the most developed regions
(Pelopponesis, Sterea Ellada) although backward compared to the community average. All
Portuguese regions clearly catch up the EC average. However, the catching up intensity is
very imperfectly correlated to the scope of the initial backwardness. This is particularly
valuable for the two insular regions: the Azores and Madeira.
– Spain (graph 6) and Italy (graph 7) are the main counter-examples against an
effective regional catching up. In Spain, Ceuta y  Melilla (the Moroccan enclave) and the
Baleares apart, no clear link is provided between the scope of backwardness and that of
catching up. Whatever the initial position, the catching up is delimitated in a narrow space.
The two relatively prosperous regions of Madrid and Catalonia record a satisfactory relative
growth performance. In Italy, the feature is clear: Mezzogiorno, except for Basilicata, catches
up neither the EC average nor the northern developed regions of Italy which are largely upon
the community average. Among these regions, the industrialized Piemonte and Lombardia are
likely to move back, while the dynamic area shifts towards north-eastern regions (Emilia
Romagna, Friuli, Trentino, Veneto)
5.
– France (graphs 8a and 8b) seems to comply with a convergence relationship thanks
to the overseas regions and Corsica. These regions apart, the French feature reveals some
strong specificity: almost all regions, even the most initially backward, move noticeably back
relatively to the community average. But, the region Ile de France is maintaining its strong
lead over all the other French regions.
– Germany (graph 9), the Netherlands (graph 10) and Belgium (graph 11) witness the
ability of rich regions to maintain, and even to improve, their relative position. This is not
inconsistent with some catching up of less favored regions. In the Netherlands, Groningen’s
decline remains an exception.
– In the United Kingdom (graph 12), all the regions move back without any
relationship to the year-base backwardness. This is a national rather than a regional feature.
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The efficiency of the structural funds conditioned by the national membership
The emphasis on the efficiency of the structural funds as to regional development
raises methodological problems. Suppose an allocation of structural funds proportionate to the
initial regional backwardness measured by the GDP per capita and a b-convergence process
showing an effective catching up of backward regions for the considered sample: to what
extent the structural funds, by themselves, other factors apart, tend to narrow regional
disparities ? The catching up would appear correlated to the allocation of structural funds
without any possible assertion about their explaining role. On the contrary, the game of
windfall effects in favor of catching up regions could not be excluded.
Fortunately, neither the catching up path – as  precedently described – nor the
allocation of structural funds are so simple. Differentiated performances of initially similar
regions might indicate any form of interaction between structural funds and real convergence.
Indeed, the allocation of structural funds obeys a range of well known criteria and
effective practices not reducible to the measure of GDP per capita. Witness graph 13. The
relative regional per capita GDP in 1986 is compared with the cumulated structural funds over
the two budget periods in favor of each region. This total is measured in ECU 1997 per
inhabitant and compared to the EC average (the level 100 corresponds to regions which
benefited from an allocation of structural funds per inhabitant equal to the European average,
that is to say to the ratio total structural funds / EC12 population). If an important
backwardness pays well in terms of structural funds, there is far from an evidence of a nearly
proportionate relationship. Some backward regions received amounts of structural funds per
inhabitant quite similar to less depressed regions. The financial redistribution through the
structural funds remains very imperfect. This can be explained by two series of factors:
– On the one hand, the financial redistribution is not the single goal of the European
structural funds. Over the two first budget periods, the support of the structural funds fell into
several objectives. Only the objective 1, concerning regions with GDP per capita strictly
inferior to 75% of the community GDP per capita, is devoted to promote the catching up of
less developed regions. However, most of the structural transfers are under this objective
(more than two third over the two budget periods). The objective 2 aims at converting initially
rich regions seriously affected by industrial decline. The allocation of structural funds under
the objective 2 has apparently nothing to do with the base-year GDP per capita (graph 14).
– On the other hand, even when considering only t he first objective devoted to
backward regions, the allocation of structural funds is very imperfectly correlated to the scope16
of backwardness (graph 15). Obviously, other criteria than per capita GDP are included for
determining this allocation, and institutional bargaining implying the national, regional and
community authorities play also a decisive role. Large prerogatives for shaping the
distribution of structural funds remain to the nation-States.
Finally, another factor which noticeably alters the final  redistributive impact of the
European structural funds has to be added. In the line with the  additionality principle, the
European structural funds used to support specific programs have to be completed by national
and regional funding. This rule conditions the effectiveness of the institutional partnership.
But, the estimated co-funding rate – the total funds, private or public, European and local,
incurred over the sample period relative to the only European structural funds – is merely
correlated to the base-year regional wealth (graph 16). The co-funding rarely doubles the
European support to poor regions, although they nearly triple or quadruple it in richer regions.
Even some lead regions are exceptionnally supported.  This statement is not surprising: the
ability of richer regions to go along with the structural funds is obviously greater.
Nevertheless, the nation-States’ endeavor to tackle this anti-redistributive slant is
questionable, all the more since it remains some difficulties in checking the implementation of
the additionality principle
6.
Once all these factors considered, a very approximate relationship between the
allocation of structural funds and the catching up of backward regions is conceivable. Figures
17 to 21 illustrate this relationship: some details have been progressively incorporated. The
cumulated transfers of structural funds incurred per inhabitant, in percentage of the EC
average, are compared to a regional catching up indicator  refered to the lead region
(Hambourg in 1986 and in 1996). The indicator is defined by the following equation:
) (
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If the region i catches up the lead region, the indicator is positive, negative otherwise.
The indicator value measures the catch-up or move-back intensity in percentage of the initial
backwardness against the leader. With respect to the b-convergence process, this indicator
should be the coefficient  b itself (in percentage), similar for all regions. The graph 17,
embracing all regions and objectives, does not show this similarity. Some regions catch up the
lead region, the indicator is positive ; others move back, but the relationship with the
allocation of structural funds does not clearly appear. The same statement is valuable when
considering only the objective 1, although regional catching up prevails more clearly (graph
18). It can only be suggested that the large structural funds transferred to the regions which
appear on the extreme right side of the graph favor their catch-up, though not in a spectacular
way: peripheral and insular regions are concerned. Having a closer look at these regions
(graph19 detailing graph18) suggests that large structural transfers can be efficient. But this is
not automatic, witness the French West Indies or Corsica compared with the Irish catching up.
Those outermost regions apart, no particular feature can be derived from the set of
regions characterized by both their endowment with structural funds under the objective 1 and
their catching up indicator (graph 20). However, the national membership of each region is
particularly relevant. Regions within the same member State are figured more or less nearby
in the plane. National ellipses can be drawn by gathering most of a Member State regions.
When moving in the plane clockwise – midday as a starting point – four countries are clearly
differentiated. First the Portuguese regions with a moderate support of the structural funds
performed a clear catching up. Then comes Greece whose regions, although rather dispersed,
are well endowed with the European structural funds and honorably catch up. The Spanish
regions are also well endowed but the catching up performance is low or negative. Outside the
ellipse, the Asturias region excessively witnesses this deceiving performance (obviously all
Spanish regions are not eligible to the objective 1 and only the eligible regions appear on the
graph). Finally, the Italian  Mezzogiorno regions, more endowed than the average, are not
catching up: they move back relatively to the European lead region.
This national hierarchy extends the typology provided by the single examination of
catching up performances. If that does not allow any conclusions about the own efficiency of
structural funds, this efficiency is clearly conditioned by the national membership. For
instance, Portuguese regions and Italian  Mezzogiorno are quite similarly endowed with
structural funds under the first objective, but the structural funds appear much more efficient
within the Portuguese regions.    18
The analysis of regions eligible to the objective 2 tends to reinforce this conclusion:
the efficiency of European structural funds is conditioned by the national membership. Graph
21 highlights difficulties for regions, even largely endowed with objective 2 structural funds,
in maintaining their rank. However, this time the Spanish regions record a moderate catching
up. Regarding such a configuration, we may assume that the EU accession encouraged in
Spain relatively prosperous regions, rather close to the Pyrenean border, at the expense of the
most backward regions. Though often largely endowed with structural funds, the British
regions under the objective 2 do not succeed in restraining their decline. The same can be said
about numerous French or Italian regions eligible to that objective and gathered in a same
ellipse.
The efficiency of the structural funds for the catching up of backward regions
(objective 1) or for the threatened regions’ up-hold (objective 2) can not be dissociated from
the economic and social background in each country, which conditions the allocation of
structural funds, their execution and implementation.
Graph 13
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A preliminary econometric approach of the regional efficiency of the structural funds
In the sixth report on the social and economic situation and development of regions
(1999), the European Commission surveys the predictions of four macro-economic models
concerning the impact of structural funds on EU growth. The results lead to the conclusion
that this impact has been significant over the two budget periods 1989-93 and 1994-99.
Within the so-called cohesion countries (Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland), the estimated
impact on growth is nearly equal to one growth yearly point in the case of Greece and
Portugal. But, as noticed in the Commission report, according to the data available, the
models are only valuable at a national level and not at a regional one within each Member
State. Then, this analysis is strongly limited since the micro or macro-economic impact of
structural funds does not guarantee an effective support to regional development. A program
implemented in a depressed region might be more profitable finally to the most wealthy
regions in the same country ; those regions’ producers may satisfy the demand derived from
the structural funds and compete with local producers if the infrastructure improvement
conveys their products ; productivity gains triggered by the program may finance income
increases outside the beneficiary region. The Commission report sets out that numerous
regions eligible to the objective 1 record a productivity catching up more significant than the
per capita GDP one. Moreover, these regions do not succeed in turning the recorded
productive modernization into jobs. While the European structural funds have probably
supported the catching up of less advanced countries, the impact on regional development – a
larger concept than the productive modernization – is more uncertain.
The purpose here is only to indicate some preview and suggestive tests about factors
of regional catching up in Europe. In other words, the estimation aims at introducing some
guidelines for a comprehensive evaluation of the regional efficiency of the structural funds
rather than concluding with a definite diagnosis.
With respect to the b-convergence concept already removed in this paper, two ways
can capture factors of differentiated regional catching up results:
1– The first consists in considering that the regional b-convergence is not absolute but
conditional: other things being equal, each region grows all the faster since they are initially
backward and the b-coefficient still indicates that catching up intensity common to different
regions. But, this factor common to regional catch-ups does not exhaust their own dynamics:
each region moves towards its own «  stationary state » reflecting its underlying features.24
Thus, the national membership and the allocation of structural funds are likely to condition
regional convergence thanks to their determining impact on regional infrastructure and human
capital.
The relationship to test is measured by means of:








iT = + - = - ￿g b a                                             (1.4)
where Xij is the value taken by the factor j which conditions the regional convergence for the
region i.
Unfortunately, the results of the estimation of this completed version of the equation
(1.2) are not relevant to our purpose. Although the national membership appears as a
determining variable of regional convergence, all significant impact of the endowment with
structural funds is eliminated while incorporating this variable. We can assume that the
disclosure of the « stationary state » as a final fate of each region is not evident over such a
short and specific ten-years period (1986-1996).
We shall just indicate that the relationship (1.4), with a constant but without the Xij
variables, reveals over the sample period a very significant  b-coefficient equal to 0.23
(estimated with the entire sample of 131 regions but also with a smaller sample without the
french overseas regions, Corsica, Ceuta y  Melilla, Groningen, the Azores, Madeira, and the
three mono-regional countries, Denmark, Luxembourg and Ireland). The value of this
coefficient nearly corresponds in annual terms to the 2 per cent convergence yearly rate
estimated in several reference econometric investigations…In that way, the 1986-96 period is
not especially outlying.
2– Without judging what the «  final stationary state » of each region might be, the
influence of some factors on the observed convergence speed over 1986-96 can be estimated.
The previous figures and comments show that speed measured by the catching up indicator
(1.3) was dispersed among regions, without any clear relationship with the structural funds
endowment. But the national membership plays apparently a decisive role for the efficiency
of this support.
The estimated relationship aims at explaining directly the catching up indicator (still
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The factors j successfully inserted into this relationship are the following:
– The endowment with structural funds over the two budget periods in ECU 1997 per
inhabitant compared with the community average of this ratio (SF variable). If equal to 1, the
considered region has been granted like the community average.
– In the same way, the relative endowment with structural funds under the objective 1
(SF1) and objective 2 (SF2).
– The co-funding rates besides the structural funds. This variable CF is equal to zero in
the theoretical case that no co-funding is incurred (and obviously if there is no European
structural support) and is equal to 1 when co-funding adds 100% to structural funds, that is to
say if they double the European grant.
– The national membership. There are as much membership factors j as nations. The
membership variable Xij is equal to 1 if the region  i belongs to the country  j, and to zero
otherwise. Each membership variable will be mentioned by the name of the corresponding
country.
Table 1 replicates the results of some interesting regressions. Each regression uses
least squares with the complete sample of 131 regions (the results from the smaller sample
excluding insular regions and mono-regional countries are not significantly different except
for some cases mentioned below). Within these four regressions, the relative endowment with
structural funds has a significant and positive impact on the catching up performance,
whatever variables incorporated otherwise. The coefficient of the SF variable does not vary
much: between 4 and 6.5. If that variable SF goes from 1 to 2, in other words if the
endowment shifts from the community average to twice this support, the ten-years catching
up indicator increases by 5 points (the yearly increase of the convergence rate is
approximately 0.5%). Equation (2) suggests this result is only due to objective 1 structural
funds. Equation (4) indicates the own impact of the structural funds is probably expanded by
co-funding, although its return can decrease relatively to the structural funds they complete.
Nevertheless, this weak influence of co-funding confirms display practices inflating credits
incurred  not effectively implemented.
The variables of national membership are not equally significant but some seem to
hinder deeply the regional catching up. This is obvious for the French, Italian, British regions
and less significant in the Spanish case. The moving back of  Groningen particularizes the
Netherlands. Once this region removed from the sample, the Netherlands like Germany and
Belgium are archetypes of the neutrality of national membership for the regional
development. The case of Luxembourg, a mono-regional country, is very particular: this26
wealthy region was initially close to the lead region of Hamburg, but then levels off while
Hamburg still goes forward. In such a case, the catching up estimator is very sensitive to a
moving back however not disastrous. If Luxembourg is eliminated from the sample, the
coefficients of the other variables of national membership do not vary much. Finally, the
French unsatisfactory performance remains after deleting the overseas regions and Corsica
from the sample.
Table 1. Some regressions explaining the speed of regional catching up (equation 1.5)
             Equation
Variables
1 2 3 4
Constant –10.1   (4.6) –7.0   (2.6)
FS 6.5   (3.9) 4.0   (2.2) 4.8   (2.5)
FS1 4.2   (3.4)
FS2 –1.6   (1.2)
CF 2.3   (1.4)
Germany 0.2   (0.0) –4.1   (0.6)
Belgium –1.5   (0.3) –5.5   (0.9)
Denmark 4.5   (0.3) –0.5   (0.0)
Spain –4.9   (1.0) –9.5   (1.6)
France –18.5   (5.0) –23.8   (4.4)
Greece 6.4   (1.2) 4.0   (0.7)
Ireland 16.2   (0.8) 9.8   (0.5)
Italy –10.9   (2.6) –15.9   (2.9)
Luxembourg –76.1   (4.3) –82.3   (4.5)
Netherlands –10.6   (2.1) –17.4   (2.4)
Portugal 10.1   (1.3) 7.3   (0.9)
United Kingdom –20.5   (3.8) –27.4   (4.1)
R
2 0.10 0.13 0.37 0.38
Legend:
–  The numbers between brackets are the t Student.
–  When the national membership variables are present in the equation, it is not possible to insert a constant, as
the constant is a linear combination of these twelve variables. In fact, their introduction differentiates the
constant according to the country.
The regressions in Table 1 just point some indicative issues. Obviously, the
determinants of regional convergence are far from being exhausted: the dynamic impact of
regional advantages and handicaps should be clarified through relevant variables. But, these
regressions suggest that the efficiency of the structural funds as for regional growth interferes
with the national membership of eligible regions. The national idiosyncrasies influence the
regional catching up, rather in a negative way in the case of France, Italy, the United
Kingdom and Spain. The reasons for such an handicap are various: the industrial decline27
hinders all British regions ; in Italy the relative decline of northern former industrialized
regions comes with a new moving back of Mezzogiornio so that the dynamic area moves
towards the north-eastern regions ; in France, the region Ile-de-France still remains a pole of
attraction at the expense of too many regions ; in Spain, the benefits of EU accession have
been first concentrated on relatively prosperous regions. When the national membership is
neutral, indeed positive without being really significant in the case of Greece and Portugal,
the efficiency of the structural funds is not thwarted.
Conclusion
In the sixth report on the social and economic situation and development of regions,
the European Commission is pleased with “the surprisingly rapid rhythm of convergence in an
historical or international prospect over the period 1986-96”. This assertion can rely on an
overall estimation of convergence, even tough the convergence process, as previously
emphasized, is not exceptional. This is also amended, in the same report, when noticing the
prosperity of the richest and poorest regions increases whereas numerous average regions
level off. Nevertheless, the Commission is unaware of the features, which hinder the catching
up of numerous moderately or poorly developed regions. In particular, the role of the national
« imprint » over regions is not much taken into account,  especially as to the expected
efficiency of the structural funds. It is all the more surprising since the report theorizes about
the programming, management and evaluation of the operations having recourse to structural
funds. No doubt that the compared evaluation of national practices as to regional development
has to progress !
Combined with the results of other investigations, the conclusions we draw from this
study can highlight a range of propositions which sums up the nation / region interaction
within the European integration process. Those propositions would deserve to be ascertained
as regards their normative implications.
1– The regional growth performances are naturally influenced by the national
membership. On the one hand, each region benefits from the performance of the nation to
which it belongs, other things being equal ; on the other hand, what is less trivial, the
inequality of regional development varies from a country to another. The catching up of
backward regions is much more significant in Portugal or Greece than in Spain or Italy. The
dynamics of regional inequalities have a strong national « imprint ».28
If some studies prove inter-regional convergence in Europe, it largely relies on
prevailing inter-national convergence beyond economic fluctuations ; and the regions within a
catching-up country take part in this evolution. For the most backward regions, this is all the
more profitable when the national level successfully gives the impetus to the inter-regional
catching up, but all European countries do not have this feature in common. Finally, shifts in
inter-national convergence condition the inter-regional convergence: if rather strong in the
period 1950-70, this inter-regional convergence has probably been much slower since 1970
although the European structural funds were soaring
7.
2– The advantages of a given region are revealed by its location inside the moving
geography of European networks. The resulting regional imbalances form an integral part of
the overall European growth process. The development of a region balances the impact of
both its own advantages, compared with the other European territories, and the national
membership. The factors strictly territorial (geographical location, proximity to dynamic
centers, externalities between bordering regions) take part in these advantages
8. The
interaction between European and national dynamics does not guarantee an equality of
opportunities between regions.
3– The European structural funds are not sufficiently efficient in order to remedy these
regional discrepancies, although this is clearly their main goal. Indeed, the aim of the
structural funds is not only to redistribute financial resources but also to strengthen the factors
determinant to regional development. Neither the micro-economic efficiency of programs
financed by structural funds, nor their macro-economic efficiency is challenged by this
statement. On the contrary, several recent investigations set out the significant impact of the
structural funds on the catching up of the less developed countries in Europe
9. However, the
possible macro or micro-economic success is not equivalent to an automatic benefit in favor
of the development of the least favored regions. When a project financed by structural funds
triggers local productivity gains, their allocation may not benefit to the target territory.
4– As an explanation to this unsatisfactory efficiency of the structural funds as to
regional development, comes the nature of the institutional and economic relationships
between the community level, each nation and its regions:
• The primary redistribution associated to the structural funds can be limited by
some efficiency considerations. Some regions close to the community average in terms of per
                                                                
7 See Armstrong and Vickerman (1995) ; Fagerberg and Verspagen (1996).
8 See Quah (1995)
9 See Cour and Nayman (1999) ; De la Fuente and Domenech (1999)29
capita GDP are well endowed with structural funds since the national growth and the
development of backward regions are expected to derive from that support. A more
redistributive allocation of the structural funds would cushion regional inequalities but could
also slowdown the collective growth
10. Besides, a component of structural funds aims to
hinder rich regions’ decline (especially the objective 2 over the two last programming periods,
dedicated to promote the conversion of regions facing an industrial decline). This action is
fully legitimate (although its efficiency is doubtful): indeed, it should be not convenient to
base the intra-european redistribution on an excessive egalitarianism confirming the decline of
rural and industrialized regions formerly prosperous. On the contrary, the co-funding practice,
in the line with the additionality principle, is more questionable since it seems to soften
largely the redistributive effects of the structural funds. This regional or national co-funding is
all the more significant since the region is initially rich.
• The funds allocated to poor or declining regions are likely to benefit to
wealthy regions within the same country, since the supply of these regions complies with the
demand derived from European funds, or the producers of the most favored regions convey
their products thanks to new infrastructures in poor regions.
• The programming of the structural projects and the distribution between the
structural funds sometimes imply some devious interactions between the regional, national
and community institutions. The programming, implementation and evaluation are often
centralized at the nation-State level. A decentralized management of the operations of the
structural funds would better take regional dynamics into account. Although they provide co-
funding, the regional communities do not have a decisive role for thinking or managing the
European programs. Officially regions are said community subjects in accordance with the
rules of partnership and additionality. However, in practice national devices remain dominant.
They hardly perceive the geographical dynamics at work, because this dynamics depends
largely on European determinant factors. The coordination between the national, territorial
community authorities conditions the efficiency of the structural funds.
Since the nation does not satisfactorily correct its internal imbalances, we could
assume the necessity of more integrated territorial and redistributive policies at the European
level. A spatially unified and heterogeneous Europe is a durable feature and the eastern
enlargement will increase this heterogeneity. Without any appropriate procedure at the
European level, controlling the heterogeneity process remains difficult for it takes form at this
                                                                
10 See, in the Spanish case, De la Fuente and Vives (1995)30
level. The inequality of opportunities prevails among European regions, disclosing not only
their intrinsic advantages and handicaps but also their location in a modifiable European
geography. Consequently, there are reasons for thinking of more ambitious redistributive rules
among European territories, indeed among European individuals themselves, in the line with
progress towards fiscal federalism. It is also reasonable to shift towards more integrated
territorial policy at the community level (refering for instance to the cross border programs
Interreg), which would take geographical imbalances into account for the allocation of
structural funds. Today, the community support framework has too many similarities to a
juxtaposition of negotiated sector interventions. Better transnational cooperation of territorial
policies could reinforce the efficiency of the community policies as to regional convergence.
The implications of the increased concentration, both spatial and thematic, of the
structural funds, confirmed by the European Council in Berlin in March 1999 for the
programming period 2000-2006, are conditioned by these institutional aspects. The number of
objectives are reduced from five to three: catching up of backward regions (whose GDP per
inhabitant is inferior to 75% of the community average), economic and social conversion of
areas facing structural difficulties and adapting policies of education, training and
employment. These objectives should concern one third of the EU population, instead of 50%,
even if the European Council introduced some transitional measures. If this concentration
goes along with a better efficiency, it will be profitable to the whole Europe and not only to
eligible areas. A more decentralized management of the structural funds next to an integrated
territorial  policy could favor such an evolution by balancing efficiency and solidarity worries.
Only reinforcement of the concentration of the structural funds, by hardening the eligibility
criteria, risks to trigger a zoning policy, i.e. an accurate split in eligible areas (down to urban
districts !) which can elude the concerns of global efficiency, without being an especially
democratic procedure. If the  subsidiarity principle is necessary to definition and
implementation of regional and structural policies, we are wondering whether the European
Union can do without an integrated territorial policy – perhaps initiated by the European
Spatial Development Perspective (European commission, 1997) – so that the rules of
partnership and additionality give rise to a balanced control of the European geography.
Marrying integration to decentralization is a requirement which tackles deep-rooted habits of
the nation-States.31
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